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INTRODUCTION

In general, attorneys must not reveal confidential information
relating to the representation of their clients.'
Moreover,
attorneys must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
attorneys they supervise, as well as their nonlawyer employees,
maintain client confidences. 2 In a bygone era, attorney-client
communications consisted of face-to-face meetings (which might
have included notes of the discussion) and exchanges of written
letters. 3 Today, however, technology virtually guarantees that
attorneys and clients will communicate electronically and that
these electronic communications will be memorialized, copied,
archived, and perhaps accessed by others with whom the attorneys

1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by [Rule 1.6(b)]."); cf. id. 1.6(b) (permitting
lawyers to reveal confidential client information if they reasonably believe it is necessary
to prevent "certain death or substantial bodily harm," or other certain crimes and
fraudulent activities committed by the client in which the lawyer's services have been
used).
2. See id. 5.1 (providing that supervising attorneys must "make reasonable efforts to
ensure [subordinate attorneys] conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct"); id. 5.3
(detailing that supervising attorneys must ensure that the nonlawyer assistant's "conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer").
3. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole PractitionerUses the "Electronic Office" to
Maintaina Competitive Law Practice,3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 147 (1998) (highlighting
that in the past lawyers relied on telephone and mail service rather than electronic
communications); Ronald W. Staudt, Does the GrandmotherCome with It?: Teaching and
PracticingLaw in the 21st Century, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 499, 520 (1994) ("Electronic
mail supplants some communications that previously occurred by visit, telephone, and
memoranda."); see also Robert H. Thornburg, Electronic Discovery in Florida, 80 FLA.
B.J. 34, 34 (2006) ("Today, over 90 percent of a company's documents are created
electronically, but never printed. The filing cabinets of yesteryear have gone by the
wayside and have been replaced by desktops and laptops.").
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did not intend to share the information. 4 While most attorneys
would not knowingly betray client confidences, there is a growing
problem of unintended disclosure through technological means,
including those both nefarious and accidental. 5 Many attorneys
are probably unaware of the magnitude of these risks.6 How does
an attorney gather and utilize the information necessary to
represent the client effectively, and at the same time, maintain
procedures that prevent the unintended disclosure that could ruin
the client's case and subject the attorney to discipline or
malpractice claims? Many technology and security protections
that are available are not yet widely used in the legal profession.7
Awareness of the problems and possible solutions are critical first
steps to addressing these concerns.
In this essay, we examine why the law recognizes attorney-client
confidentiality, what possibilities exist for unintended disclosure
through technology, and how attorneys can adapt to these new
realities in order to fulfill obligations of effective representation
and maintenance of client trust and confidences. We will also
discuss a tripartite approach to information security that an
attorney can employ to better protect client information.

4. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Did Lawyer's E-Mail Goof Land $1B Settlement on
NYT's Front Page?, ABA Journal, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/

(illustrating one example of an
lawyers-e-mail.gooflands-on-nyts-front-page/
unintended technological disclosure to a third party: misaddressed e-mail); see also
SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT.

SECTION, INFORMATION

SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 167-68 (Sharon D. Nelson et al. eds., 2006)
(providing methods to keep a secure message archive).
5. See generally SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION,

INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 13-23 (Sharon D. Nelson et al.

eds., 2006) (highlighting different means in which a lack of information security can lead to
accidental disclosure, such as unauthorized access to computer networks through
inadequate password protection and failure to maintain operational firewalls, leading to
spyware or full compromise of computers).
6. See id. at 35-36 ("Lawyers tend to have less experience and focus less attention
upon the stealthy information security risk that arises from their increasing use of
information technology as a legal practice tool.").
7. See id. at 48-50 (explaining that there are currently no standards set by the ABA
for a minimum amount of information security, but that the adoption of such standards
would provide considerable guidance to lawyers who need to respond to the increasing
threat).
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WHY RECOGNIZE ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY?

A. The Nature of Confidentiality
Human beings have a basic need to form relationships based
upon trust.8 One element of trust is the mutual willingness of
those involved in a trust relationship to keep within the group.
Perhaps an early example involved tribal members keeping secrets
within the tribe as to the location of food stores or supplies. 9
Similarly, the safety of a group would be compromised if
information regarding defense systems was spread to hostile
outsiders. 1°
On an emotional level, we seek to find someone with whom we
can share our innermost thoughts, ambitions, concerns, and
fantasies with the expectation that these shared matters of intense
personal concern will not be broadcast to others. Consider, for
example, the lyrics composed by Paul McCartney and John
Lennon: "Do you want to know a secret, [d]o you promise not to
tell?"'" A negative response to the second of these inquiries
would end the hope of a relationship held by the person making
the inquiry. The first of these inquiries points to perhaps another
8. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust As a Social Reality, 63 SOc. FORCES
967, 968 (1985) (stating that "trust may be thought of as a functional prerequisite" to form
other types of societal relationships).
9. Few records exist of early tribal decisions to secrete food stores, but plainly the
ability to gather food and keep its location secure would have increased the chances for
group survival among early humans. As one example, dotted throughout modern Israel
are archaeological sites which include hidden, underground access routes to water wells.
See AMIHAI MAZAR, ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE LAND OF THE BIBLE 10,000-586 B.C.E.
478-85 (1990) (describing underground water systems in ancient Israeli cities designed to
limit access to the city's inhabitants).
10. Hiding weapons stores seems to be another obvious method to ensure group
survival. Searching out these secret caches is an important undertaking when another
group seeks to minimize their threat. See Terry Frieden, Feds Find Weapons Cache Near
Mexican Border, CNN.COM, Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/02/03/
laredo.arsenal/index.html (discussing the capture by federal authorities of an arsenal of
illegal weapons belonging to Mexican drug trafficking groups); Major Weapons Cache
Seized in Iraq, MILITARY.COM, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.military.com/NewsContent/
0,13319,126519,00.html (reporting the seizure of a large cache of weapons used to create
roadside bombs in Iraq); Weapons Cache Found in Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, Apr. 18,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/2959261.stm (describing the efforts of coalition
forces to locate weapons caches in Afghanistan and in the process discovering the largest
weapons cache in Afghanistan).

11.

THE BEATLES, DO YOU WANT TO KNOW A SECRET?

availableat http://www.dmbeatles.com/song.php?song=56.

(Parlophone 1963),
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basic human interest: people seem to want to know secrets,
although, as discussed below, learning and maintaining a secret
may create significant burdens for the person who must keep that
secret.12
The law recognizes this deep-seated human need to create and
maintain confidential relationships for reasons of physical and
emotional well-being. For example, communications with health
care providers 13 and clergy1 4 are afforded evidentiary privileges
and privacy protection.
Spouses enjoy the legal right to
communicate in most regards without being subjected to forced
disclosure of the discussion. 1 5 Educational records are protected
by federal law. 1 6 In addition, a host of privacy laws and precedent
afford a remedy against prying eyes, ears, and hands.1 7
12. See Anita E. Kelly et al., What Is It About Revealing Secrets that Is Beneficial?, 27
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 651, 651 (2001) (reporting that people who do not

reveal negative secrets "are more depressed, anxious, and shy and have lower self-esteem
and higher levels of general symptomatology" (citations omitted)).
13. See TEx. R. EVID. 509 (defining the Texas physician-patient privilege); FED. R.
EVID. 501 (stating that federal privilege shall be governed by common law and applicable
state laws); see also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996) (requiring the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate rules determining privacy
standards for patient health records). The final HIPAA rule promulgated by the
Secretary became effective April 14, 2003 and created a substantial list of privacy
requirements to protect patient information. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534 (2007).
14. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing
the clergy-communicant privilege as long as the communication was conducted in
confidence with a clergyperson acting in an official capacity).
15. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) ("[C]onfidential
communication between husband and wife [is] privileged."). But see Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1980) (outlining the limits of spousal privilege when one spouse
chooses to testify against the other in a criminal matter).
16. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b) (Supp. III 2003) (denying federal funds to educational institutions that violate
confidentiality by releasing student records to unauthorized individuals or agencies).
17. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402-3403 (2000) (prohibiting financial institutions from
releasing customers' financial records except in compliance with subpoena or search
warrant); 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000) (providing criminal penalties to anyone who opens mail
"to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another"); id.
§ 2511 (providing criminal penalties to anyone who intentionally intercepts "any wire,
oral, or electronic communication"); id. §§ 2701-2702(a) (providing criminal penalties for
anyone who knowingly discloses electronic communication provided through the means of
communication or access to the electronic storage); id. § 2710 (creating a civil cause of
action for a video tape service provider who releases consumer information to an
unauthorized person); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971)
(explaining that the First Amendment does not give the media "a license to trespass, to
steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office"
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Even where the law does not recognize a legally-enforceable
privilege, various professions often seek to afford a shelter from
disclosure. For example, journalists routinely agree to speak to
sources "off the record" and insist upon maintaining confidences
even in the face of court orders to the contrary. 8
Yet, there is still conflicting sentiment about maintaining
confidences. By definition, the person who guards a secret is being
secretive; he or she is not being completely "open." Indeed, when
inquiries are directed to the person regarding the confidential
matter, the response by the person maintaining the secret may be
fairly characterized as evasive at best or even downright dishonest.
Ironically, journalists, who are among the strongest proponents for
maintaining the confidentiality of their own sources, are also
among the most vocal advocates for open record and sunshine
laws. 19 This conflict between maintaining trust and, at the same
time, affording transparency or openness is reflected in conflicting
claims of privilege and privacy.
B. The Attorney's Obligation to Maintain Confidences
It should come as no surprise that, as members of a profession
charged with protecting the well-being of their clients, attorneys
are required to maintain their clients' secrets. 20 It should also
come as no surprise that some of the societal ambivalence about
keeping secrets, coupled with public distrust of attorneys, makes
the attorney's role particularly challenging. Under the general
even for criminal investigative reporting); Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Steimle &
Assocs., Inc., 652 So. 2d 44, 47-48 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming an injunction barring the
defendants "from entering the [plaintiff's] trash dumpsters and disseminating the
information collected from the trash" based on anti-scaving and deceptive trade practices
statutes).
18. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(applying a Supreme Court ruling that the press does not enjoy a privilege of
confidentiality and must comply with court orders to reveal sources in grand jury
proceedings). After the D.C. Circuit upheld the court order compelling her to testify,
reporter Judith Miller still refused to testify and reveal her source for the leak of covert
C.I.A. agent Valerie Wilson's name. Adam Liptak & David Johnston, A Reporter Jailed:
The Overview; Reporter Jailedafter Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at
Al. Miller spent over twelve weeks in jail before deciding to testify after her sources
waived confidentiality. Id.
19. See Gordon Dickson, Lawsuit Filed to Keep Documents Private, Fr. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 25, 2005, at B5 (reporting that newspapers made open records
requests in regards to contracts concerning the Trans-Texas Corridor).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).

2008]

LOOSE LIPS SINK A TTORNEY-CLIENT SHIPS

obligation to maintain confidentiality as set out in Rule 1.6 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys are precluded
from revealing "information relating to the representation of a
client."'2 1 Rule 1.6 allows disclosure only under carefully defined
circumstances. 2 2 The underlying reason for the existence of the
rule is that the maintenance of the confidentiality "contributes to
'2 3
the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship."
This trust in the attorney will result in the client feeling
"encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and
frankly with the attorney even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter."' 24
The importance of maintaining
attorney-client confidentiality and allowing attorneys to decline to
reveal confidential information obtained from their clients has
been recognized as necessary "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients." 2 5 Even
where the attorney has preliminary discussions with a prospective
client that do not result in the creation of an attorney-client
relationship, the attorney nonetheless must maintain the
confidences acquired in those communications. 2 6 Supervisory
attorneys must "make reasonable efforts to ensure that"
subordinate attorneys 2 7 and nonlawyer assistants 28 comply with
the professional rules, including maintaining confidences.
On a practical level, maintaining confidence is of utmost
importance to both attorneys and their clients. 2 9 Attorneys who

21. Id.

22. See id. 1.6(b) (permitting a lawyer to reveal confidential client information if the
lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary "to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm," or other certain crimes and fraudulent activities committed by
the client in which the lawyer's services have been used).
23. Id. 1.6 cmt. 2.
24. Id.
25. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). "The attorney-client
[evidentiary] privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential
communications." Id.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2007) (enumerating the
duties owed by lawyers to prospective clients).
27. See id. 5.1 (explaining the duties of supervisory attorneys, including reasonable
efforts to guarantee that subordinate lawyers comply with the professional conduct rules).
28. See id. 5.3 (explaining the responsibilities of supervisory attorneys regarding
nonlawyer assistants, including reasonable efforts to ensure that nonlawyers are complying
with the professional conduct rules).
29. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-9
(1998) (explaining the importance of confidentiality to both lawyers and clients). Within

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:781

fail to adequately protect their clients' information may face a
number of repercussions including: discipline (e.g., sanctions,
suspension, or disbarment) for violating professional responsibility
31
rules; 30 liability or sanctions under federal or state statutes;
32
malpractice claims for incompetence or negligence; and loss of
the legal profession, however, there exists some controversy regarding the underlying
purpose of confidentiality. Some critics suggest that the legal profession, not the client or
society, is the primary beneficiary of confidentiality requirements because confidentiality
increases the demand for legal services. See id. at 3 (recognizing that confidentiality rules
"made clients more willing to hire attorneys").
30. See, e.g., People v. Hohertz, 102 P.3d 1019, 1022-24 (Colo. 2004) (relating
disbarment of attorney because the attorney committed several ethics violations, including
revealing client confidences); In re Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 649, 661 (Kan. 2003) (affirming
censure of an attorney for disclosing confidential information to opposing counsel about
his client's unrelated pending defamation case); Akron Bar Ass'n v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.
3d 307, 2004-Ohio-2835, 810 N.E.2d 426, at
40-43 (upholding a two year suspension
imposed on an attorney for improperly disclosing his client's confidences during a
deposition); State v. Chappell, 2004 OK 41,
13-28, 93 P.3d 25, 28-31 (imposing a one
year suspension upon an attorney who used confidential information in a court
document); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schafer, 66 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Wash.
2003) (approving a six month suspension for a lawyer who revealed his client's
confidences); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 2001 WI 71,
21-22, 29,
244 Wis. 2d 438,
21-22, 29, 628 N.W.2d 351,
21-22, 29 (ordering a six month
suspension of an attorney for disclosing a client's medical records to a prosecutor who was
prosecuting the client's cohabitant).
31. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 264-72 (2005) (analyzing the duty to protect database
information). Professor Johnson's article discusses the possibility of liability under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, codified in scattered sections of Title 12 and Title 15 of
the United States Code. Id. at 266-70. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial
institutions must protect the security of customers' nonpublic personal information. 15
U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000) ("It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has
an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to
protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic personal
information."). While the plain language of the Act "generally does not cover retail
merchants that do not issue their own credit," the Federal Trade Commission nonetheless
has aggressively used the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to pursue actions against nonfinancial
companies. Benita A. Kahn & Heather J. Enlow, The Federal Trade Commission's
Expansion of the Safeguards Rule, 54 FED. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 39, 40-41 (discussing FTC
enforcement actions of the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act against nonfinancial institutions); see
Heath Dixon, FTC Nails Company for Failing to Implement Reasonable Security,
PRIVACY SPOT, Nov. 21, 2004, http://privacyspot.com/?q=node/view/429 (reporting
charges against Petco Animal Supplies for failing to have reasonable security to protect its
online customers). See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the
Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 263-80 (2005) (discussing liability under state
statutes).
32. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 272-76 (2005) (discussing a potential cause of action for
negligence when a business fails to safeguard confidential information); see also MODEL
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reputation, including professional embarrassment or negative
media exposure. 33 Attorneys may believe they are using good
faith and competent, reasonable actions to protect their clients'
information from security breaches, and yet, through an act of
carelessness, may inadvertently allow unauthorized access to the
information. 3a These disclosures may result in problems such as
identity theft, loss of intellectual property protection, client
embarrassment, exposure of legal strategy, or other detrimental
effects-any of which could result in significant losses to the
clients.35
III. UNINTENDED DISCLOSURE VIA TECHNOLOGY
Before computers, attorneys generally wrote down a client's
information and stored the file in a lockable file cabinet in a
lockable office.3 6 During this time, securing file cabinets and
offices, usually through locks, was considered a reasonable
precaution to safeguard client information.3 7 Although offices
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2007) (discussing the duty of lawyers with

regard to confidential information).
33. See, e.g., Chris Dettro, Court Disbars Attorney Involved in Drug Probe, ST. J.REG., June 5, 2007, at Local 31 (reporting disbarment of an attorney for drug use with
clients and for profiting from the sale of confidential reports); Bob Egelko, The BALCO
Case: Admitted Leaker Agrees to Longer Prison Term, S.F. CHRON., July 6, 2007, at B4
(reporting about a lawyer who accepted a plea agreement to serve two years and nine
months in prison for leaking confidential information to a newspaper); Gregory D. Kesich,
Court Disbars Lawyer for String of Complaints, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 15,
2004, at 2B (detailing the reasons for disbarring a lawyer, including "client neglect,
excessive fees, incompetency, [and] unauthorized disclosure of confidential information");
Jonathan Saltzman, Lawyer May Face Disbarment, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2005, at B5
(reporting an attorney facing disbarment for posting confidential information on her
website about a boy being sexually abused by his father and for negligently failing to use a
pseudonym for the boy's name in court proceedings).
34. Cf. Erik Runge, Gold Mine for ID Thieves: Thousands of Records Found in
Dumpster, http://www.woai.com/news/local/story.aspx?contentid=1a103b0d-d2bd-4ba999c2-214020cbed75 (last visited May 20, 2008) (reporting how confidential material
belonging to a law firm, including clients' social security numbers and medical records, was
found in a dumpster).
35. Cf. In re Huffman, 983 P.2d 534, 543 (Or. 1999) (discussing potential harm to
client due to the attorney's disclosure of confidential information).
36. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole PractitionerUses the "Electronic Office"
to Maintain a Competitive Law Practice, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 147 (1998) (noting
that historically lawyers did not use electronic means of communication).
37. See Peter E. Moll & J. Michael Hennigan, Using Document Imaging and
Technology as Marketing Tools, 13 No. 1 ALA NEWS, Dec. 1993-Jan. 1994, at 36
(describing how traditional methods of safeguarding client information recorded on paper
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could be broken into or client conversations surreptitiously
listened to with tapping, this was usually considered too farfetched to be a legitimate concern to law firms.3 8
As computers became more prevalent, the legal profession, like
other businesses, began to rely on the convenience of electronic
files stored on computers within networks and transmitted through
e-mails. 39 However, the ease of electronic transmission also
seemingly made it less apparent whether an electronic file had
been inappropriately accessed, altered, or copied.4 0 Additionally,
relatively inexpensive listening devices and cameras are available
and can now be used to spy remotely on conversations.4 1
Attorneys who continue to secure their offices with locks alone
may not realize that walls and windows are permeable to sound
waves and electromagnetic transmissions, potentially allowing
unauthorized access.4 2 While attorneys may respond that this type
files have become outdated by modern electronic files).
38. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 252 (1979) (explaining the difficulties of
installing wiretapping devices at that time). But see David F. Halbfinger, Investigator to
the Stars Is Convicted in Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/16pellicano.html (discussing the extensive
wiretapping operations of private investigator Anthony Pellicano and the possible
involvement of entertainment attorney Bert Fields); David Jackson, Watergate's Tidal
Wave: 25 Years Later, Scandal's Imprint Remains on Government, Society, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, June 15, 1997, at 1A (discussing the events and consequences of the
break-in and attempted wiretapping of the Democratic National Committee headquarters
in the Watergate Hotel).
39. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole PractitionerUses the "ElectronicOffice"
to Maintaina Competitive Law Practice,3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141,147 (1998) (explaining
the benefits of transmitting documents via e-mail).
40. See KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION:
CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 180-81 (2002) (describing how to

avoid detection while accessing documents on a computer). But see Microsoft, HOW TO:
Audit Active Directory Objects in Windows Server 2003, http://support.microsoft.com
kb/814595 (last visited May 20, 2008) (providing step-by-step instructions to enable
auditing on a Windows Server). Windows auditing allows administrators to track failed
and successful access to documents. Id.
41. See Spy Associates, http://www.spyassociates.com (last visited May 20, 2008)
(advertising and selling information gathering items such as cameras, tracking devices,
recorders, and computer software). See generally Christopher J. Selin, Eavesdroppingon
the Compromising Emanations of Electronic Equipment: The Laws of England and the
United States, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LAW 359, 359-60, 363 (1991) (describing the
history of spy technology, which started as physical eavesdropping and evolved into
commonplace listening devices).
42. See Michael Evans, Inside the Most Bugged Offices in the World, TIMES ONLINE,
Feb. 27, 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1031533.ece (describing a
"laser aimed at the window of a targeted office [that] can detect minute reverberations in
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of behavior from opposing counsel would violate the rules of
professional responsibility, the fact remains that the "adversarial
party" is not always another attorney who is bound to play by the
professional rules.4 3
Instead, the adversarial party may be
someone who is able or willing to disregard legal and ethical
constraints on gathering information.4 4 Further, there is an even
higher risk associated with law firms that handle cases involving
national security. 45 The various ways which information might be
unintentionally exposed or disclosed are limitless. 46 The following
scenarios and accompanying discussions illustrate the potential
problems. After examining these problems, we will outline an
approach attorneys should use in fulfilling the obligation to protect
the glass caused by conversations"); see also Kevin Murphy, Consumers Set Sights on Tiny
Cameras, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at F4 (stating that spy technology is
available for purchase by the common consumer).
43. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. 1998) (recounting how an employee
at a company found and used information from the company's legal department against
her employer).
44. See, e.g., id. at 348-49 (explaining that an employee who wanted to bring a sexual
harassment lawsuit against a former manager of the company gave her attorney
confidential papers prepared by the corporation's legal staff); David F. Halbfinger,
Investigator to the Stars Is Convicted in Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/16pellicano.html (reporting that a
jury found private investigator Anthony Pellicano guilty on seventy-six counts, most
related to illegal wiretapping). As another example of parties willing to disregard the law,
a recent Business Week story detailed an attempted e-mail attack on Booz Allen
Hamilton. Brian Grow, Keith Epstein & Chi-Chu Tschang, The New E-spionage Threat,
BUS. WK., Apr. 21, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_16/
b4080032218430.htm (describing an e-mail sent to a Booz Allen Hamilton executive which
was crafted to trick the recipient into clicking on a link in the e-mail, thereby installing
spyware on the computer). While similar attacks aimed at broad audiences (called
phishing) are common, the Booz Allen Hamilton e-mail was unusual because it was aimed
at a specific individual (called spear-phising). Id. The information used to tailor the
e-mail to the Booz Allen Hamilton executive was gleaned from public information. Id.
45. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, US. Expanding Its Effort to Halt Spying by Allies, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at 34 (discussing the attempts by the French government to engage
in corporate espionage against United States corporations working in aerospace and other
government-related industries); see also Jason Kirby, Corporate Espionage Is Big
Business, MACLEAN'S MAG., July 2, 2007, at 34 (discussing courts' and prosecutors' slow
responses to claims of corporate espionage).
46. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF
DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 13-242 (2002)
(describing the different ways confidential information can be leaked). One organization
provides running totals of data breaches.
See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A
Chronology of Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm
(last visited May 20, 2008) (listing data breaches, including an up-to-date total number of
records lost due to breaches).
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these confidences.
A. Hotel Room Security
In the first scenario, several attorneys are working on a case
away from home and staying in a hotel. After a hard day's work,
the attorneys return to their hotel and make dinner plans. They
consider leaving their laptops in the trunks of their rental cars, but
they fear the risk of having the cars broken into or stolen. Instead,
they decide that it is safer to leave their computers in their hotel
rooms: because the rooms were cleaned earlier in the day, no one
is expected to come into their rooms for the rest of the evening.
When they return to their hotel rooms, nothing appears out of the
ordinary. Yet, once back in their home office, it seems that
opposing counsel anticipates their legal strategy and is
knowledgeable about the confidential aspects of the case.
Was there a security breach? Consider this possibility: an
investigator bribes hotel personnel to inform him when members
of a certain law firm check into the hotel. Perhaps the maid or
bellboy learns this information from the luggage tags on the
attorneys' bags identifying their firm. 47 While the attorneys are
enjoying dinner, the investigator enters their rooms using the
informant's key card. This allows the investigator an opportunity
to access the attorneys' computers and to attempt to copy files.
Maybe the investigator successfully installs software on the laptops
to create a secret account whereby the investigator can access the
computer remotely. 4 8 Alternatively, the software may send files
back to the investigator whenever the computer is connected to
47. Compare Studio 6 Extended Stay Hotel, Accor Privacy Protection Policy,
http://www.staystudio6.com/about/privacy.asp (last visited May 20, 2008) (providing the
hotel's privacy policy, including the policy not to give guest information to third parties),
and Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts Privacy Policy, http://fourseasons.com/privacy.html
(last visited May 20, 2008) (assuring that no guest information will be given to third
parties), with Marcus Bruninghaus, Protecting Guest Data: Why Hotel Information Security
Awareness Training Is So Important, ENTER. INNOVATOR, Apr. 21, 2006,
http://enterpriseinnovator.com/index.php?articlelD=7291&sectionID=25 (urging hotels to
properly train employees regarding information security issues to prevent the majority of
incidents that are caused by human error and improper training).
48. See, e.g., AceSpy, http://www.acespy.com/details.html (last visited May 20, 2008)
(selling spy software products). "AceSpy Spy Software makes it easy to secretly see what
others do online. After you install, it will begin secretly recording EVERYTHING that is
done on [the personal computer]. AceSpy is COMPLETELY hidden from others. They
won't know it's running unless you tell them!" Id.
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the Internet.4 9 The attorneys never realize what has happened,
and therefore cannot trace the adversarial party's actions to this
incident.
What security precautions could have prevented these security
breaches? Should laptops never be left unattended? 50 Would it
matter if the laptops were password protected? 5 ' In reality,
attorneys should take only limited comfort in password protection,
52
as passwords can sometimes be broken using automated tools.
Short of carrying a laptop around (with the possibility of either
leaving the laptop or having it stolen), what can be done? The
problem with this type of post hoc analysis is that it is reactive and
typically establishes a "band-aid" '5 3 approach to fix the problem.
For example, today a firm has a laptop stolen from an attorney's
car at lunch, so tomorrow it establishes a rule that laptops are not
to be left in cars during lunch. Unfortunately, such solutions do
not possess the necessary preventative aspect to counter future,
unknown attacks.
B. Insider Threat and Social Engineering

In the second scenario, a large law firm routinely and diligently
trains its support staff personnel in security processes and
establishes rules for all aspects of computer security. 54 For
49. See NetVizor, http://www.spytech-web.com (last visited May 20, 2008) (selling
computer monitoring software that records and transmits all information and keystrokes
from one computer to another computer). There are several versions of computer
monitoring software available with a variety of spyware features, including remote
capabilities and the ability to control the targeted computer. Id.
50. See Mark Bassingthwaighte, Ten Technology Traps and How to Avoid Them, W.
VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34, 34 (noting that keeping a laptop in sight, carrying it on a
plane, using password protection, and using encryption software can keep confidential
client information safe).
51. See generally id. (recommending several steps that lawyers and employees may
take in order to prevent laptop security breaches).
52. See Yahoo Password Hack Freedownload, http://www.brothersoft.com/
downloads/yahoo-password-hack.html (last visited May 20, 2008) (providing users access
to free programs that restore user login passwords); Top 100 Network Security Tools,
http://sectools.org (last visited May 20, 2008) (listing the top security tools, as voted upon
by visitors to the website). The list of network security tools includes several password
decrypting tools available for free. Top 100 Network Security Tools, http://sectools.org
(last visited May 20, 2008).
53. See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 162 (2001) (defining band-aid as "a
makeshift, limited, or temporary aid or solution that does not satisfy the basic or longrange need").
54. See generally HOWARD I. HATOFF & ROBERT C. WERT, LAW OFFICE POLICY &
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example, the firm implements a rule that passwords must consist of
a minimum number of letters and numbers and be changed
regularly.5 5 The law firm also hires a well-known and highly

competent computer company for maintenance of its computers
56

and networks. The computers are routinely checked for viruses,
worms, 5 7 spyware, 5 8 Trojans, 5 9 and spam 6 ° by the latest security

software.

Despite this effort, however, highly confidential

information in documents stored on a single computer used only
by a long-term and trusted staff member becomes known by an
adversary party.
What was the source of a security breach? Consider two

possible explanations.

The first possibility is rather obvious.

Perhaps the once well-trusted staff member has become a
disgruntled employee who has provided the adversary with a copy
of the files. 6 ' A less obvious possibility is that the well-trusted
PROCEDURES MANUAL, FORMERLY LAW OFFICE STAFF MANUAL (Am. Bar Ass'n 5th

ed. 2006) (providing a basic law office manual that addresses information security and
training of new employees at law firms).
55. Cf Mark Bassingthwaighte, Ten Technology Traps and How to Avoid Them, W.
VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34, 34 (encouraging lawyers to use passwords on their
laptops so as not to grant instant access to anyone who might try to use their computers).
56. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 348 (2006) (defining virus
as "a harmful, self-replicating program usually hidden in another piece of computer code,
such as an email message"). A virus relies on user interaction to launch a separate piece
of software which allows the virus to propagate. Id. at 363.
57. See id.at 363 (defining worm as "a self-replicating, self-contained software
program that does not need to be a part of another program to propagate").
58. See id. at 298 (defining spyware as "[c]overt software that captures data about
online users' Internet surfing habits").
59. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 328 (2006) ("Named after
the Trojan Horse of ancient Greek history, it is a particular kind of network software
application developed to stay hidden on the computer where it has been installed.").
Trojans may harvest user data, provide a backdoor for attackers, or serve as a denial-ofservice tool. Id.
60. See id.at 298 (defining spain as "[u]nsolicited, unwanted, impersonal email").
61. If an employee provides an adversary with a copy of the files, this would be an
example of an insider threat. See CERT, Insider Research Threat, http://www.cert.org/
insider-threat (last visited May 20, 2008) ("Current and former employees and contractors
have exploited vulnerabilities ... to commit fraud, theft of sensitive information, and IT
sabotage."). While many insider threats are disgruntled employees, some are also
"plants," people who obtain jobs for the express purpose of procuring information for
another party. Insider threats are one of the fastest growing and hardest to detect security
breaches. See Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
http://cybercrime.gov (last visited May 20, 2008) (reporting federal computer crime cases
and providing information about "cyberethics"); cf. SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW
PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION, INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS
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staff member may have fallen prey to "social engineering," the
technique of obtaining information or access through person-toperson contact.6 2 Social engineering relies on deceptive tactics to
trick well-meaning and honest people into voluntarily divulging
information.6 3
For example, a friendly man 6 4 approaches an employee with a
legitimate identification badge from the computer support
company hired to maintain the law firm's equipment. 6 5 The
computer company's personnel often work in the law office,
although the employee has never met this particular consultant.
The man provides a work order for routine maintenance on the
employee's printer. He apologizes profusely for interrupting the
staff member's work and offers to finish quickly to minimize the
disruption. Because the man appears to have all the proper
paperwork and valid identification, the employee allows the
"consultant" to sit at the desk while performing maintenance on
300-03 (Sharon D. Nelson et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the problem of "disgruntled
employee" insider threats). The authors of Information Security for Lawyers and Law
Firms detail "real-life nightmares" of companies where insiders stole personal information
or trade secrets, crashed systems, or stole personal files; however, none of these incidents
occurred at law firms. SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION,
INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 300-03 (Sharon D. Nelson et
al. eds., 2006).
To gauge the damage from an insider threat, consider that the most dangerous spy in
FBI history was a trusted FBI agent and supervisor, Robert Hanssen, who used his
computer expertise and direct knowledge of the workings of the internal systems to
circumvent detection for nearly twenty years. DAVID A. VISE, THE BUREAU AND THE
MOLE 224-29 (2002) (highlighting events of Robert Hanssen's times as a double agent).
See generally Dawn Cappelli, Andrew Moore & Timothy Shimeall, Protecting Against
Insider Threat, NEWS @ SEI, http://www.sei.cmu.edu/news-at-sei/columns/security-matters/
2007/02/security-matters-2007-02.htm (last visited May 20, 2008) (providing an excellent
list of practices to prevent insider threats).
62. See SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION,
INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 293 (Sharon D. Nelson et al.
eds., 2006) (defining social engineering as "the art of getting people to divulge information
... so that there is no necessity of going to the trouble of hacking").
63. KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION:
CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY xi (2002).
64. See id. at 8 (describing social engineers as "charming, polite, and easy to like"
individuals, who use those traits to gain "rapport and trust").
65. See Philip Cornford, The Brazen Airport Computer Theft That Has Australia's
Anti-terror Fighters Up in Arms, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 5, 2003,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/09/04/1062548967124.html (describing an incident at
the Sydney International Airport where two men, dressed as computer repair technicians
and carrying tools, stole two mainframes which may have contained confidential
information).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:781

the printer.6 6
Nothing occurs to raise the staff member's
suspicions about the friendly consultant who is so intent on
minimizing the interruption of work. Perhaps the two even chat
amicably about their families. The man tells the staff member not
to bother logging off of the computer so that he can finish as
quickly as possible.6 7 While pretending to run printer diagnostics,
he inserts a flash drive into the USB port and begins to copy
files.6 8 Alternatively, he may install spyware as in the preceding
scenario. Again, the breach was not prevented, detected, or
remedied, resulting in potentially substantial harm.
This scenario illustrates two of the more prevalent and arguably
69
underestimated security intrusion techniques: (1) insider threats
66. Assuming that the firm's attorneys know nothing of the events transpiring, the
law firm will not be responsible for any violation of the rules of professional conduct that
results from the staff member's actions. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.3(b)-(c) (2007) (stating that a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer
employee is responsible for the conduct of persons that violate rules of professional
conduct only if the attorney orders or specifically approves the conduct, or knows of the
conduct and takes no action to avoid or mitigate the consequences).
67. See KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION,
CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 41 (2002) ("The more a social

engineer can make his contact seem like business as usual, the more he allays suspicion.").
68. See How to Use a USB Flash Drive (PC Computer), http://www.hs.iastate.edu/it/
support/instructions/Howto_UseUSBflashdrive_(PC_.Version).doc (last visited May
20, 2008) (giving the user steps to properly copy files from a computer to a flash drive). To
copy documents from a computer to a flash drive, you first insert the flash drive into a
USB port in the computer. Id. Then you locate the file that you wish to copy. Id. Next,
you right-click the folder and highlight "send to." Id. You select the appropriate
"Removable Disk" according to the drive letter. Id. Before removing the flash drive,
make sure that the file was copied and then left double-click "My Computer," followed by
the "Removable Disk" that you previously selected. How to Use a Flash Drive (PC
Computer),
http://www.hs.iastate.edu/it/support/instructions/HowtoUse_USBflash_
drive-( PCVersion).doc (last visited May 20, 2008).
One example of a nefarious use of seemingly innocuous technology is "pod slurping,"
whereby an intruder connects an iPod to a USB port on an active machine on a network
and copies the contents of the target machine and documents shared on the network. See
Sharon D. Nelson, Esq. & John W. Simek, She Stole Our Company Dataand Hid It in Her
Underwear, 70 TEX. B.J. 844, 850 (2007) (describing the removal of data from a company
by an employee using an iPod). "[I]n 2 minutes, it's possible to extract about 100MB of
Word, Excel, PDF files-basically anything which might contain business data-and with
a 60GB iPod, you could probably have every business document in a medium-size firm."
Will Sturgeon, Beware the 'Pod Slurping' Employee, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 15, 2006,
http://www.news.com/Beware-the-pod-slurping-employee/2100-1029_3-6039926.html.
69. See John D. Comerford, Competent Computing: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to
Safeguard the Confidentiality and Integrity of Client Information Stored on Computers and
Computer Networks, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 639 (2006) (discussing briefly insider
threats and the lawyer's responsibility for the conduct of employees who handle
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and (2) "social engineering."' 70 Insider threat is a risk that comes
from within the organization, either through disgruntled
employees or "plants."' 7 1 In fact, it is estimated that 84% of
security breaches come from insider threats.72 There is no reason
to believe that law firms are more immune from insider threats
than any other company.
The second technique, social engineering, uses deception to
mislead individuals into providing information, as explained
above. For example, Kevin Mitnick, who excelled at social
engineering, used a process of data aggregation to obtain the credit
information of his target: by retrieving pieces of seemingly
meaningless information from a number of sources, the
aggregation of the pieces could be used to attain the desired
information. 7 3 In fact, many computer break-ins occur not
confidential information).
70. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF
DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 173-224 (2002)

(providing an excellent treatise on social engineering). This book also lists several social
engineering ploys which gain access to confidential information over the telephone or in
person. Id.
71. See CERT, Insider Threat Research, http://www.cert.org/insiderthreat (last
visited May 20, 2008) (asserting that an insider may be a current or former employee who
knows how a company's system works).
72. See SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION,
INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 303 (Sharon D. Nelson et al.

eds., 2006) ("The Gartner Group reports that 84% of high-cost security incidents occur
when insiders send confidential information outside the company."); see also CERT,
Insider Threat Research, http://www.cert.org/insiderthreat (last visited May 20, 2008)
(providing reports and podcasts from the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie
Mellon University on security issues including protection against insider threats).
73. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF
DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY ix-xii (2002)
(describing the way Mitnick went about his "art of deception"). Mitnick could begin with
just the name of an intended target and within four or five conversations with wellintentioned people, gain enough information to gain access to the target's confidential
financial information. See id. at 15-29 (giving various examples of people giving out
confidential information after a few conversations). One case, documented in his book,
concerns a private investigator (PI) who assisted a wife divorcing her husband. Id. at 1622. The wife's attorney was unable to locate the husband's assets. Id. The PI called the
bank pretending to be an author and obtained the correct terminology ("Merchant ID")
for the bank to identify itself to its credit bureau; called the bank a second time and, using
the correct lingo, passed himself off as a customer service representative from the bank's
credit bureau and obtained the bank's Merchant ID; and finally called the credit bureau
and identified himself as the bank with the correct Merchant ID, the husband's name and
social security number, and obtained all his financial information. KEVIN D. MITNICK &
WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF
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through hacking into the computer or network but by obtaining
system access codes through friendly chats.7 4 Clearly, mere
password protection rules will not prevent social engineering
attacks.
C. E-mail Correspondence
The third scenario begins with a client who is upset about the
time billed for a particular matter. The client engages in a lengthy
sequence of back-and-forth e-mail communications with the
accounts receivable department in the law firm. The client
requests a complete history of the issue including detailed billing
over a two year period.7 5 The accounts receivable department
gathers the extensive information and e-mails it to the client.7 6
Although both the client and the accounts receivable department
claim to have used the "reply to" e-mail function during the
SECURITY 16-22 (2002).
Mitnick's books, including The Art of Deception, contain a treasure trove of
techniques for obtaining confidential information from helpful and friendly staff who
never realize the deception. See id. xv-xvi (introducing the various techniques that are
outlined in the book). Mitnick is fond of saying that the most powerful computer security
is useless if hackers can con helpful targets into revealing access information. Rebecca
Harrison, 'Computer Terrorist' Kevin Mitnick Now Teaches Antihacking, COMPUTER
WORLD, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/
0,10801,109351,00.html.
74. See generally KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART OF
DECEPTION: CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 15-146 (2002)
(providing examples of methods used to obtain information such as building trust, offering
help, and using sympathy tactics).
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007)

(laying out the

requirements for effective communication between attorneys and clients); id. 1.5
(establishing the rules for assessment of fees on a client in exchange for service). These
two provisions, when read together, indicate that communication regarding fees is
essential to maintaining an open and effective relationship between attorney and client.
See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.03, reprintedin TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.,
tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) (codifying the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct's stance on the necessity of
communication between the client and the attorney); id. 1.04 (explaining the Texas rules
regarding how attorneys should charge their clients). E-mailing a client may satisfy both
the requirement of communication and the exhortation to memorialize fee agreements in
writing.
76. See generally TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05, reprinted in TEX.

GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X,
§ 9) (codifying the requirements of confidential communication to clients); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (establishing the ABA's
approach to the relationship between the need for confidentiality and e-mail
communications).
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exchange, the accounts receivable department inadvertently sends
the information to the client's old e-mail address at her former
employer. Consequently, the law firm erroneously sends the
client's information to the wrong party.77 The law firm does not
discover the error until the client again requests the information.
D. Disposal of Old Computers

In the last scenario, a law firm acquires new computers either by
purchase or lease.7 8 Several alternatives exist to dispose of the old
computers. 79 Being a good corporate citizen, the law firm could
donate to charity any old computers owned by the firm. 8° Prior to
donation and conscious of the need to destroy any client
information on the hard drives, the firm may engage the services
of a business that specializes in removing such information
permanently. 81 On the other hand, instead of purchasing the
computer equipment, the firm may simply lease its equipment and
82
allow the vendor to switch out and upgrade old workstations.
Regardless of the disposal method, law firms need to consider and
77. It should be noted that even if the information is sent to the correct address, an
unencrypted e-mail can be read by anyone who intercepts the e-mail.
78. See Karen A. Clanton, Ode to Joy, 18 CBA REc. 43, 44 (2004) ("Law firms on
the other hand, upgrade and replace their computers all the time."); cf Steve Bickerstaff,
Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal
Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1, 30 (1999) (noting "[t]he continuous
pressure on personal computer users to upgrade or replace their systems or applications").
79. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 29-31 (2004) (providing an excellent list of various
scenarios related to ethical considerations stemming from the disposal of hard drives and
old computer systems); see also Mark Bassingthwaighte, Ten Technology Traps and How
to Avoid Them, W. VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34, 39 (listing proper disposal of
sensitive data among the top concerns facing modern-day litigants).
80. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Where Can I Donate or
Recycle My Old Computer and Other Electronic Products?, http://www.epa.gov/
epaoswer/hazwaste/recycle/ecycling/donate.htm (last visited May 20, 2008) (showing the
EPA's extensive computer recycling, disposal, and reuse program). The page provides
advice for business and personal donors, as well as useful links to various recycling
programs. Id.
81. See generally Secure Destruction Bus., http://www.sdbmagazine.com/ (last visited
May 20, 2008) (providing links, articles, and trade information to businesses seeking
secure destruction of their sensitive documents).
82. See e.g., Dell Computer Inc., Asset Recovery & Recycling Services,
http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/services/en/assetrecoveryservices?c=us&l=
en&s=corp (last visited May 20, 2008) (describing Dell's computer recovery and recycling
program). The Dell program is an example of a recycling program and some of the
benefits of allowing the manufacturer to reclaim old workstations. Id.
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address the possibility that confidential client information remains
stored on the computers and may pass into the hands of third
parties.
Legal scholars have recently begun examining the many
repercussions of this scenario.8 3 There is a growing awareness of
what can happen to the hard drives of discarded computers, or
more precisely, what can happen to the data contained therein.8 4
It is also more commonly known that deleting files on computers
does not delete the information from the hard drive any more than
deleting a card catalogue in a library deletes the books stored
there.8 5 What is less commonly known is that reformatting a hard
drive, even a number of times, does 86
not prevent the recovery of
drive.
hard
that
on
stored
information
As a consequence of the lack of knowledge, there are several
well-publicized examples of computers being discarded without
proper removal of confidential student,87 medical, 8 and legal
information.8 9
In fact, Simson Garfinkel of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology has built a database of information
gathered from discarded hard drives retrieved from, among other
83. See Mark Bassingthwaighte, Ten Technology Traps and How to Avoid Them, W.
VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34-40 (playing out various scenarios where attorneys may
breach their clients' confidences by improperly disposing of sensitive data).
84. See United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[Wlhen a
computer file is deleted, the contents of the file are not irretrievably lost."). "The space
occupied by the file is flagged as available, and until new data is stored in that location the
deleted file can be recovered using an undelete tool." Id.
85. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 29 (2004) (explaining that deleting a file from a
computer does not permanently remove the file, as well as exploring the ethical issues
regarding this problem).
86. See, e.g., Will Knight, 'Cleaned' Hard Drives Reveal Secrets, NEWSCIENTIST, Jan.
16, 2003, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3274 (pointing out how
researchers employed simple techniques to recover data off hard drives after they had
been reformatted). The techniques were so successful that the researchers were able to
collect over 6000 credit card numbers, most from a hard drive once used in an automated
teller machine. Id.
87. See generally Privacy Rights ClearingHouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited May 20, 2008)
(providing a detailed, chronological list of reported privacy violations stemming from
computer theft, data breaches, and improper disposal methods).
88. See generally id. (providing a detailed, chronological list of reported privacy
violations stemming from computer theft, data breaches, and improper disposal methods).
89. See Tom Spring, Hard Drives Exposed, PC WORLD MAG., Apr. 3, 2003, available
at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,110012-page,1/article.html (exposing several stories
of computer users losing sensitive data by improperly disposing of old hard drives).
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sources, eBay, city dumps, and small businesses. 90 As Garfinkel
notes, people discard "broken" hard drives that frequently can be
restored by unconventional procedures. 9 1 In a similar project, a
group of reporters for PC World Magazine found a treasure trove
of computers with vulnerable data during an excursion in
Boston. 9 2 One computer, previously owned by a Boston-area
attorney, contained, among other files, bank account numbers and
draft legal documents. 9 3

As illustrated by the data retrieval examples above, many
individuals (and undoubtedly many attorneys as well) do not know
what is required to permanently remove data from a computer, or
wrongly assume that data cannot be retrieved from a broken hard
drive. What if a computer vendor promises to scrub the hard
drives? 94 How does a law firm ensure95that confidential client data
is not present on discarded machines?
Having examined the possible scenarios of unintended
technological disclosure, we turn to constructing a framework that
attorneys should implement to fulfill their obligation to reasonably
guard their clients' confidences in a technological context.
90. See Simson L. Garfinkel & Abhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study
of Disk Sanitization Practices, 1 IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY 17, 24 (2003), available at
http://www.computer.org/portal/cms.-docs-security/security/vlnl/garfinkel.pdf (reviewing
and summarizing the research of the authors, who were able to obtain numerous hard
drives from various sources and harvest the sensitive data contained on many of them,
despite their previous owners' attempts to clear such data).
Review,
Technology
to
Garfinkel
Simson
of
Posting
91. See
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/garfinkel/17609/ (May 25, 2007) (describing how
data from supposedly broken hard drives may be retrieved by placing the device in the
freezer overnight).
92. See Tom Spring, Hard Drives Exposed, PC WORLD MAG., Apr. 1, 2003,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,110012-page,1/article.html ("An examination of ten
used hard drives we bought or salvaged in the Boston area disclosed a wealth of sensitive
data. On all but one of them, we found data, including confidential business, medical, and
legal records; Social Security, credit card, and bank account numbers; e-mail .... ).
93. See id. (reporting the contents of a salvaged PC previously owned by an area
attorney).
94. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2007) (explaining that a
lawyer must take reasonable steps to ensure that nonlawyers employed by the attorney act
in compliance with the professional rules).
95. The most effective method of preventing others from retrieving confidential
information is the physical destruction of the hard drive. See Kim Komando, Microsoft,
Clean the Hard Drive Before Dumping Your PC, http://www.microsoft.com/
australia/smallbusiness/issues/technology/protect/harddrive.mspx (last visited May 20,
2008) ("The only absolute and assured way of protecting your data is to destroy the hard
drive.").
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REASONABLE MEASURES TO PROTECT CONFIDENCES

The legal profession has begun to educate its practitioners about
confidentiality issues involving the use of technology.9 6 At a
minimum, every attorney should review any relevant technologyrelated publications by the American Bar Association,9 7 state and
local continuing legal education providers,9 8 academics, 99 and
government agencies. 100 Technology changes rapidly, and while
attorneys are quite busy keeping up with their own cases and

substantive developments in their particular practice areas, it is
now likely that maintaining some familiarity with technological
advances is going to be part of the "reasonableness" required to
guard client confidences. 10 '
96. E.g., Nathan Brooks, Information Privacy, 54 FED. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 4
(dedicating the entire issue of the publication to information privacy). However, while the
articles therein offer attorneys an excellent summary of developing law in this area, other
publications provide little or no practical advice on the application of these standards. See
Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005) (noting the many
ethical issues tied to electronic storage of client information).
97. See generally American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource Center,
FYI: For Your Information, http://www.abanet.org/tech/ltrc/fyidocs/ (last visited May 20,
2008) (providing advice to attorneys for a variety of technical concerns including computer
disposal, wireless networking, and data backup).
98. See generally The Law Practice Management Program of the State Bar of Texas,
Disaster Preparedness: Securing the Firm, MCLE Course No. 900023298 (Sept. 2007);
John Podvin & Irene Kosturakis, Identity Theft: How to Protect Your Practiceand Clients,
State Bar of Texas (via webcast) May 10, 2006; Merri A. Baldwin & Kathryn Fritz,
Information Ethics for Lawyers: Information Management-Knowing What You Have,
Why You Have It, and How to Dispose of It (Without Breaking the Law or Violating
Ethical Duties), 11253 PRACTICING L. INST. 637, 643 (2007) (discussing steps in preserving
all types of documents including "'deleted' files and file fragments recovered from
forensically captured image of hard discs"). These sources stand out as excellent examples
of CLE courses regarding proper measures to protect client confidences.
99. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology,
31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (recognizing potential risks with digital
data and suggesting measures attorneys should take to avoid violating rules of professional
conduct); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches,
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 932-69 (2007) (proposing approaches for protection of data leaks).
100. See generally United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Cyber
Security Tips, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips (last visited May 20, 2008) (laying out in
easy-to-click categories how to protect oneself from cyber threats). Many times, the
practices of government agencies are considered behind the times. However, when it
comes to security, especially cyber security, certain federal government agencies tend to
lead commercial practices by a number of years. This may be due to the critical concerns
of national security.
101. See Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005)
(deciding that an attorney is required to take reasonable steps to prevent any client
information stored on digital sources from being stolen or lost). It is not out of the
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It is also important to recognize that something beyond basic
technological understanding may be required when an attorney or
a firm is involved in a particularly large or important
undertaking. 10 2 The extent of technological protection afforded
by a solo practitioner in a small civil case might not be reasonable
if employed by an attorney or law firm handling a large corporate
merger or a death penalty case.10 3 Some minimum protection
should be afforded by all attorneys, but additional safeguards may
be needed to satisfy the reasonableness requirement where the
risks are heightened. 10 4
A review of judicial opinions, ethics opinions, and the Model
question to presume that this level of reasonableness requires underlying knowledge to
competently use such data storage; that is, the attorney must have the capability to store
information without allowing a third party to access that data. Id. (discussing how the
lawyer may employ certain technological safeguards to protect confidential materials).
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 ("Special circumstances,
however, may warrant special precautions [to protect transmissions of confidential
information]. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's
expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to
which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality
agreement.").
103. In general, a lawyer must exercise "reasonable diligence" in representing a
client, which is determined, in part, by the importance of the matter to the client. This, in
turn, is a factor of the client's own assertions as to the importance of the matter, as well as
the attorney's assessment as to the impact of the matter upon the client's affairs. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. c (2007) (listing the
various factors that an attorney must consider in order to meet the standard of reasonable
diligence). Moreover, attorneys with a particular area of concentration or skill might be
held to have a higher duty to clients than those who lack this expertise. SUSAN SAAB
FORTNEY

& VINCENT R. JOHNSON,

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

LAW: PROBLEMS AND

PREVENTION 71 (2008). Obviously, a death penalty case would require great diligence in
many areas, including the use of technology. "Computer problems" were cited by defense
attorneys for Michael Richard as the reason they requested that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals remain open twenty to thirty minutes later than the 5 p.m. closing time
on September 25, 2007. Chuck Lindell, Criticism Grows for Judge over Execution,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 2007, at B1. The request was denied; the after-hours
appeal was not accepted by the court, and Mr. Richard was executed. Id.
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (commenting that
special precautions may be necessary in special circumstances to protect transmissions
containing confidential information); see also Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of
Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005) (noting the ethical requirements of Arizona lawyers to
retain outside assistance if they are unable to adequately meet the needs of protecting
their clients' confidences in electronic communications and data storage). Analogously,
where the scope of litigation expands, so too must the extent to which an attorney must
protect any digital resources; thus, under the Arizona Bar Committee's ruling, highly
complex litigation would require more attention to electronic data than would a simple
civil suit.
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Rules is not particularly helpful in this regard. 10 5 Most of the case
law regarding inadvertent disclosure of client confidences arises in
the context of discovery and is inconsistent regarding the issue of
whether the attorney-client privilege is waived under these
circumstances. 10 6 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
probably allow the attorney-recipient of such information to use it,
after notifying the unintending sender of the error. 10 7 Arguably
105. See Richard J. Heafey, Return to Sender?: Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged
Information, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 615 (2005) (noting that even the Model Rules
can directly conflict with ethics opinions from the same organization-the ABA).
106. See id. at 615-16 (stating that the reported court decisions do not provide clear
guidance regarding the issue of waiver).
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 4.4(b) (2007) (detailing the
required conduct for a lawyer who inadvertently receives information). "A lawyer who
receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or
reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify
the sender." Id. The comments to the rule then "punt" on the use attorneys may make of
such material:
[11 Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to
those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard
the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they
include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and
unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer
relationship.
[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers sometimes receive documents that were
mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. If a lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this
Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person
to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps,
such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these
Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been
waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives
a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been
wrongfully obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, "document"
includes e-mail or other electronic modes of transmission subject to being read or put
into readable form.
[3] Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the
lawyer learns before receiving the document that it was inadvertently sent to the
wrong address. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the
decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment
ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.
Id. 4.4 cmts. 1-3.
This rule and its comments replaced the prior view of the ABA requiring the
receiving attorney to refrain from examining the confidential information, notify the
attorney who inadvertently sent it, and follow that attorney's instructions for the return or
disposal of the document. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
92-368 (1992).
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the best way to structure a plan to protect client information is to
Those
use experts in the area of information assurance.' 08
involved with effective information security programs would take
a broad perspective on the obligations of attorneys to safeguard
client information.' 0 9 It is likely that their views will become the
standard for reasonableness expected of attorneys, particularly in
view of new state statutes discussed below. 1 0 We will approach
this discussion the way these consultants would, by discussing
prevention, detection, and remediation. 1
A. Prevention

The first question the information assurance consultant would
ask of an attorney is whether the attorney can effectively and
108. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 33-34 (2004) (discussing ethical concerns and
possible solutions regarding attorneys' use of technology). Professor Beckerman-Rodau
suggests that hiring a consultant might be required "to fully understand the potential risks
of reliance on technology as a prerequisite to evaluating the reasonableness of conduct."
Id. at 10; see also Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005)
(imposing an ethical requirement to hire a consultant if the attorney personally lacks the
requisite competence to secure client information).
109. See Certifications, http://www.issa.org/Resources/Industry-Certifications.html
(last visited May 20, 2008) (listing information security certifications by topic area).
Within the information security community, there are several organizations that provide
certification based on experience in the industry and successful testing. Id.
110. See, e.g., COBIT, http://www.isaca.org/Template.cfm?Section=COBIT6 (last
visited May 20, 2008) (providing an overview of the Control Objectives for Information
and related Technology (COBIT) framework for auditing information resources); Perkins
Coie, Security Breach Notification Chart, http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/
securitybreach.pdf (last visited May 20, 2008) (charting security breach legislation enacted
in jurisdictions throughout the United States).
111. See 16 C.F.R. § 314 (2007) (outlining the standards for keeping customer
information safe). It is likely that federal and state statutes and regulations may codify
some of these good practices and eventually make them binding upon attorneys. See id.
§ 314.1 (describing the scope for safeguarding customer information). The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has implemented safeguard rules setting forth a standard of care to
protect customer records. Id. These rules are applied to financial institutions the FTC
regulates and include at least three important requirements. Id. §§ 314.1-.4. First,
designate a coordinator for the information security system. Id. § 314.4. Second, conduct
a risk assessment involving personnel training, information systems and detection,
prevention, and response to breaches. 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2007). Third, design and
implement safeguards and regularly analyze the effectiveness of those safeguards, and
update the entire security program as necessary. Id. See generally SECTION OF SCI. &
TECH. LAW, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. SECTION, INFORMATION SECURITY FOR LAWYERS

AND LAW FIRMS 5-8 (Sharon D. Nelson et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting practices for physical
security in law firms).
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appropriately prevent unauthorized access to the client's
information.'" 2 This requires an assessment of the physical
electronic environment, and
environment (including people), the1 13
the relative value of the information.
The physical environment is that which can be seen and readily
observed, and includes the physical structures and people in the
environment." 4 The physical structure includes the tangiblesthe building, offices, walls, windows, and other physical assets
(e.g., computers, paper files)-contained within." 5
Physical
security secures the physical environment against intrusion, which
can be either physical (i.e., someone breaking into the office space
or surreptitiously listening in to conversations through a wall) or
electronic (e.g., listening in through electronic means, viruses on
computers, or intercepting e-mails)." 6 Attorneys may want to
secure walls and windows, not because they are valuable and
may
7
be stolen, but because they allow access to what is inside."
Included within the physical environment are people and
personnel. Unfortunately, people, some with only the best of
intentions, are often the weakest link in the security chain.", For
example, many significant intrusions to computers begin with
social engineering. Attorneys will need to work with security
consultants to screen potential employees and educate current
112. See Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005)
(advising that attorneys have an obligation to ensure that clients' files are protected from
any potential electronic threat).
113. Telephone Interviews with Keith Frederick, Founder and President, Computer
Network, Inc., in College Station, Tex. (Apr. 7, 2006, Sept.-Nov. 2007, Sept. 28, 2007).
Mr. Frederick's forthcoming book will discuss integrating physical and electronic security
as an effective business process.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brenna G. Nava, Comment, Hurricane Katrina: The Duties and Responsibilities
of an Attorney in the Wake of a Natural Disaster,37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1153, 1156-61 (2006)
(discussing the various issues that come to pass after a natural disaster, the lawyer's
standard of care during that time, and a proposal for a paperless system to effectively
prepare and recover from such a disaster).
118. See generally United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 1992)
(affirming the conviction of Richard Miller as the first FBI officer ever to be found guilty
of espionage); United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming the
conviction of Arthur James Walker for "transmittal of classified United States defense
information to agents of the Soviet Union"); Ames v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 2d 525,
525-27 (E.D. Va. 2000) (denying Aldrich H. Ames's petition to vacate his guilty plea of
"conspiracy to defraud the United States" and "conspiracy to commit espionage").
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ones regarding these dangers, to prevent the damage from an
insider threat.1 1 9
The distinction between physical and electronic becomes
important when one considers the ways access can be obtained,
possibly through a combination of intrusions against the physical
and electronic environments.' 2 0 The nature of security is that it is
tempting to emphasize one environment over the other or neglect
the fact that it is the integration of the environments that must be
secured. 12 1 Consider the electronic environment of the computer
system, including the mode of communication (wireless or hardwired), the network, and the computers themselves.
Some
companies protect the electronic environment without considering
that one of the most effective means of gaining access to computer
data is to steal the computer-a physical intrusion. 12 2 In fact,
laptop thefts are one of the most critical vulnerabilities that can be
exploited, including theft from hotel rooms, "smash and grab"
23
thefts from automobiles, and switching machines at an airport.'
Finally, to formulate a plan for preventing access to client
information, the consultant would need to have some idea of the
relative value of the information.' 24 The more valuable the
information, the greater the obligation of the attorney to secure it,
and the more sophisticated prevention systems would need to be

119. KEVIN D. MITNICK & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THE ART
CONTROLLING THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF SECURITY 245,324 (2002).

OF DECEPTION:

120. Telephone Interviews with Keith Frederick, Founder and President, Computer
Network, Inc., in College Station, Tex. (Apr. 7, 2006, Sept.-Nov. 2007, Sept. 28, 2007).
121. Id.
122. See Absolute Software, Computer Theft & Recovery Statistics,
http://www.absolute.com/resources/computer-theft-statistics-details.asp (last visited May
20, 2008) (stating that computer theft or loss accounts for 54% of breaches related to
identify theft and that 47% of surveyed computer security professionals indicated a laptop
theft sometime in the last twelve months); see also Philip Cornford, The Brazen Airport
Computer Theft That Has Australia'sAnti-terror Fighters Up in Arms, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Sept. 5, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/09/04/ 1062548967124.html
(describing an incident at the Sydney International Airport where two men stole two
mainframes).
123. See Nationwide, Curb 'Smash-and-Grab' Theft, http://www.nationwide.com/
newsroom/smash-and-grab.jsp?oys-car-theft&pos=archive (last visited May 20, 2008)
(addressing "smash and grab" theft and listing laptops as among the items vulnerable to
such thefts).
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007) (discussing

instances in which a lawyer should take special precautions to prevent a client's
information from "coming into the hands of unintended recipients").
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implemented. 12 5

To satisfy the requirements of Model Rule 1.6, we recommend
that attorneys conduct a prevention analysis by working with a
qualified consultant 1 26 to implement a security plan, including a
plan for backing up data1 2 7 and destroying files where
appropriate.' 2 8 These preventive measures represent a significant
step towards fulfilling the attorney's obligation
to reasonably
2 9
protect the client's confidential information.1
B. Detection
How does an attorney know if a security breach has occurred?
Some breaches might be obvious, particularly if the breach
involves an alteration of the physical environment. 1 30 Broken or
unlocked doors and windows, missing computers, and other
related physical changes would give cause for the attorneys to call
in the technology consultant to determine the nature and extent of

125. Id.; Ariz. Bar Ass'n Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005).
126. See CERT, CERT-Certified Computer Security Incident Handler,
http://www.cert.org/certification/ (last visited May 20, 2008) (outlining a certification
program for individuals with experience handling computer security who wish to
"achieve[] the knowledge, skills, and abilities to be a highly successful security
professional").
127. See SearchStorage.com, Backup Basics: Three Backup Plans, Oct. 2, 2003,
http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/tip/1,289483,sid5_gci930542,00.html (outlining backup
plan basics which advise users to backup files daily, perform a full backup weekly, and test
the backup process monthly or quarterly, as well as off-site storage and removable data
storage media).
128. See National Association for Information Destruction, Inc., NAID: Membership
Info, http://www.naidonline.org/join/membership.html (last visited May 20, 2008)
(outlining the mission of this international association for companies that provide services
to destroy information: "to educate business, industry and government of the importance
of destroying discarded information and the value of contract destruction services").
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2007) ("'Reasonable' or

'reasonably' when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer."). A "[r]easonable belief' refers to the fact
"that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that
the belief is reasonable." Id. 1.0(i). "Reasonably should know" is used to "denot[e] that a
lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question."
Id. 1.0(j).
130. See Mary Brandel, Data Scandal: Do You Know How to Respond to the
Inevitable

Security

Breach?

You'd

Better, COMPUTERWORLD,

Oct.

3,

2005,

http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,105065,00.html
(discussing the importance of immediate response, teamwork, and deliberate speed
needed when responding to a security breach).
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loss.' 3 1 A change in personnel, particularly if someone leaves
under unpleasant circumstances, would also give cause for the
1 32
consultant to review and reset security measures.
Unfortunately, many breaches, particularly those involving the
electronic environment, may not be readily apparent. 1 33 Files can
be copied and transferred to compact discs, flash drives, or other
machines. The very nature of the ongoing acceleration of the
transfer of data will probably increase the likelihood of data theft.
No system now, or in the future, is or ever will be, totally
secure. 1 3 4 Unfortunately, the first sign of data loss might be when
an adversary suddenly seems to know confidential communications or litigation strategies.
Before that point, however, the most reasonable method of both
prevention and detection is a regular auditing process involving
internal personnel and external security consultants. 1 35 Auditing,
in this sense, means determining the status of the security system
and producing a snapshot of the current security.' 3 6 The
131. See CERT, CERT-Certified
Computer Security Incident Handler,
http://www.cert.org/certification/ (last visited May 20, 2008) (offering a certification
program example for experienced individuals in the computer security field).
132. See Brian Contos, Enemy at the Watercolor: Inside IT Threats Increasing,
TECHNEWSWORLD, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/49652.html
(recognizing that companies must understand that threats from inside their organization
may be more dangerous than threats from outside the organization). But see Larry
Downes, Shareholder Values, CIO INSIGHT, Nov. 6, 2006, at 2, http://www.cioinsight.com/
c/a/Past-Opinions/Shareholder-Values/ (pointing out that while companies may have
individuals devoted to finding sources of information leaks, it should take care not to go
about it in appropriate ways).
133. See Sharon Gaudin, Asking for Trouble: Most Companies Don't Have Plans to
Handle Data Breach, INFO. WK., May 22, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=199701313 (reporting the results of a survey done by the
Ponemon Institute of over 700 security and IT managers finding "[ajround 85% of IT and
security managers say they've suffered a data breach, but less than half have a plan in
place for when it happens again").
134. See Alison Fitzgerald, Careless Workers Expose IRS Data, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2007, at E4 (describing an incident where auditors posing as help-desk technicians
persuaded IRS employees to give out their passwords and change them to ones suggested
by the auditors); see also Steve Brewer, Programmerwho Allegedly Broke into NASA
Computers is Indicted, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2007, at 21 (explaining that a hacker
obtained encrypted passwords and "used an Internet password-cracking tool" to decipher
the passwords and gain entry to NASA computers).
135. See RICK LEHTINEN, DEBORAH RUSSELL & G.T. GANGEMI SR., COMPUTER

SECURITY BASICS 108 (2006) (describing a security audit and noting possible problem
areas). "A security audit is a search through your system for security problems and
vulnerabilities." Id.
136. See NATIONAL STATE AUDITORS ASSOCIATION

&

THE

U.S. GENERAL
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consultants' goal is to determine what must be done to improve
security based on the snapshot assessment and to develop a
migration plan. 13 7 Auditing is a necessary component of the
security process as a way to monitor status constantly. 13 8 Another
use of auditing is to close the gap between what is intended and
what is actually practiced. 139 For example, prevention of insider
threats might include an auditing exercise to determine if an
employee would allow an outsider-through social engineeringto breach security. Although the employee has been trained, the
efficacy of that training should be tested with an actual exercise.
Throughout the security process, auditing is used to determine not
only what4 0might happen, but also to identify the weak links in the
process. 1

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A JOINT INITIATIVE: MANAGEMENT PLANNING GUIDE FOR
INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY AUDITING 6 (2001), http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/

mgmtpln.pdf ("IS security auditing involves providing independent evaluations of an
organization's policies, procedures, standards, measures, and practices for safeguarding
electronic information from loss, damage, unintended disclosure, or denial of
availability."); ISACA, http://www.isaca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About-ISACA/
Overview andHistory/Overview andHistory.htm (last visited May 20, 2008) (providing
an overview and history of ISACA, an organization composed of security and auditing
professionals).
137. See NATIONAL STATE AUDITORS ASSOCIATION & THE U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A JOINT INITIATIVE: MANAGEMENT PLANNING GUIDE FOR
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
SECURITY
AUDITING
24 (2001), http://www.gao.gov/

special.pubs/mgmtpln.pdf (describing the role of consultants relating to information
security). "Consultants may offer immediate capabilities not otherwise available without
considerable start-up time and cost." Id.
138. See RICK LEHTINEN, DEBORAH RUSSELL & G.T. GANGEMI SR., COMPUTER
SECURITY BASICS 108 (2006) (discussing the importance of conducting audits to evaluate
security systems). "It's a good idea to check on the security of your system by performing
periodic security audits." Id.
139. See DAVID CODERRE, GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY AUDIT GUIDE CONTINUOUS
AUDITING: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSURANCE, MONITORING, & RISK ASSESSMENT 4

(2005), http://www.acl.com/pdfs/IIA GTAG-May05.pdf (explaining that the other
component of continuous auditing, besides risk assessment, is to focus on control
deficiencies). In essence, auditing aims to assure that controls that were developed in
order to achieve a particular purpose are operating efficiently. Id. at 5. "Continuous
control assessment will allow internal auditors to assess the adequacy of management
monitoring activities and provide ... assurance that the controls are working effectively
and that the organization can respond quickly to correct deficiencies that arise." Id.
140. See id. at 4 (specifying control assessment and risk assessment are the two main
components to continuous auditing). Control assessment focuses on whether the
processes that are in place are suffering any deficiencies, and risk assessment focuses on
processes that are "experiencing higher than expected levels of risk." Id.
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C. Remediation
In addition to the reasonableness requirement set out in the
Model Rules, recent legislation has added to attorneys'
obligations. At the time of this writing, thirty-five states require
businesses to notify their customers or clients if there is a security
breach involving sensitive personal information. 1 4 1 These laws
generally apply to any business maintaining the information of a
resident of the state which enacts the statute. 14 2 Thus, an attorney
might be subject to laws of various states depending upon the
domiciles of the individuals whose sensitive personal information
the attorney possesses. 14 3 Further complicating the matter is the
fact that these laws are not completely uniform.' 4 4 To understand
the remediation obligations and some questions concerning the
applicability of this legislation, consider the impact and
applicability of Texas statutes, patterned after similar legislation in
California.
In 2007, the Texas 80th Legislature enacted the following law as
part of the Texas Business and Commerce Code:
Any person who maintains computerized data that includes sensitive
personal information not owned by the person shall notify the owner
or license holder of the information of any breach of system security
immediately after discovering the breach, if the sensitive personal
information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by
145
an unauthorized person.

141. David L. Silverman, Data Security Breaches: The State of Notification Laws, 19
No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 5 (2007). An interesting assertion in Silverman's
article is that these laws may reach beyond a state's borders to anyone maintaining
personal information in any state, thus making the holder of information potentially
subject to the strictest law. Id. at 7. See generally State Breach and Freeze Laws,
http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm#breach (last visited May 20, 2008)
(providing links to breach laws of thirty three states).
142. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007)
(requiring someone who conducts business in Texas to notify any resident of this state
when a breach occurs). Notification is required if the personal information "was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person." Id. § 521.053(c).
143. See id. § 521.053(b) (implying that a lawyer with a client in Texas, whose
personal information was accessed, would be subject to the laws of Texas).
144. See David L. Silverman, Data Security Breaches: The State of Notification Laws,
19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 5 (2007) (describing the differences among the
states and their respective notification laws relating to security breaches).
145. Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 885, § 2.01, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1905,
1906 (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 2007)).
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The law defines sensitive personal data as:
"Sensitive personal information" means, subject to Subsection (b),
an individual's first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following items, if the
names and the items are not encrypted:

(A) social security number;
(B) driver's license number or government-issued identification
number; or
(C) account number or credit or debit card number in
combination with any required security code, access code, or
password14 that
would permit access to an individual's financial
6
account.

This statute seems to impose a notification requirement on any
attorney who loses enough confidential client information to risk
theft of the victim's identity.14 7
Because many discovery
documents have, at a minimum, identifying information such as a
social security number or driver's license number, 148 this law
seems to apply to more circumstances than most attorneys are
probably aware.149

For example, if an attorney loses, either by theft or accident, a
laptop, PDA, flash drive, or CD containing clients' sensitive
personal information, the attorney must contact affected clients

146. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (emphasis
added). Subsection (b) excludes any "publicly available information that is lawfully made
available to the public from the federal government or state or local government." Id.
§ 521.002(b).
147. See id. § 521.053(c) (explaining that an individual who maintains a data system
with personal information has a duty to notify the owner of the personal information when
a breach occurs and sensitive information is reasonably believed to have been
compromised).
148. Id. § 521.002(a)(2)(A)-(B).
149. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 933 (2007) ("[Model One] is marked by a low threshold
for notification" and, as such, it would not be surprising that many Texas attorneys are in
situations where the laws could be implicated). Professors Schwartz and Janger have
classified the Texas statute in their terms as a "Model One" law, exemplified by California
Senate Bill 1386, on which the Texas statute is modeled (if not explicitly copied). Id. at
933. The Model One characterization, as a pure notification model, has a "low threshold
for notification" and "lacks a coordination infrastructure to mitigate the harm flowing
from a data security incident." Id. Their article makes an argument for even more
effective and useful models than Model One for notifying clients of data security breaches.
Id. at 933-35.
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"immediately after discovering the breach," 150 even though the
attorney may have all files backed up and neither the clients nor
the attorney would notice any disruption in their work. This is
true because when a breach occurs, the information has been
acquired by a third party who, by definition, is an unauthorized
person. 151
Theoretically, attorneys could avoid the statute by encrypting
the sensitive personal information. 52 The term "encryption,"
however, is not particularly helpful. While encryption is generally
understood to be the means of translating data into something that
is not understandable by those who are not authorized access,
1 53
there are no mandatory, industry-wide encryption standards.
Some vendors may use encryption techniques based on the
vendors' proprietary algorithms.1 54 Peter Coffee, a well-known
writer on computer security issues, took issue with an encryption
150. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Most lawyers
do not realize that this type of legislation might apply to them. As generally acceptable
and reasonable standards become more pervasive, lawyers will find themselves held to the
generally accepted standard. These standards are developing through application of
ethical rules. For example, Opinion No. 05-04 by the Arizona Bar Association Committee
on the Rules of Professional Conduct discusses the ethical duty of law firms in Arizona to
protect client information, especially data stored in electronic format. Ariz. Bar Ass'n
Comm. on the Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 05-04 (2005). A standard is emerging through
statutes and regulations. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2007) (requiring maintenance of "a
comprehensive information security program"); see also David L. Silverman, Data Security
Breaches: The State of Notification Laws, 19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 5 (2007)
(stating that at least thirty-five states have enacted notification laws concerning data
security breaches).
151. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
152. See RICK LEHTINEN, DEBORAH RUSSELL & G.T. GANGEMI SR., COMPUTER

SECURITY BASICS 141 (2006) (defining encryption as "transform[ing] original information
...
into

transformed information" so that others cannot read or understand the original
information).
153. See id. at 36 (outlining the movement toward creating a standard encryption
algorithm and the movement's subsequent demise). Today, a host of powerful encryption
tools are readily available as open source programs. Id.; cf. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION 197: ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)

(2001), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fipsl97/fips-197.pdf (announcing the adoption
of the Rijndael algorithm as the federal government's Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)). Over the past seven years numerous vendors have adopted AES as the de facto
standard encryption algorithm.
154. See Winn Schwartau, To Hell with Proprietary Encryption Algorithms,
NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 27, 2001, http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2001/
0827schwartau.html (explaining that vendors continue to create proprietary algorithms for
their encryption processes, which are vulnerable to hackers).
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provision in a recent California bill.' 5 5 He pointed out that an
encryption is not a yes-or-no attribute and explained that "[w]eak
crypto algorithms or poor implementations of good algorithms or
poorly administered deployments of even robust crypto products
are equally hollow in their promises of protection.' 1 5 6 As a result,
many attorneys would encounter difficulty in ascertaining whether
their7 files are encrypted, and if so, how "strong" the encryption
is.

15

There are other questions raised by state statutes, including
issues related to whether or not notice of a breach is even
required.' 5 8 The complexity of these issues once again points to
the need for the attorney to utilize a competent 1consultant
in
59
planning and implementing any remediation scheme.
Moreover, attorneys will likely face tort liability for security
breaches. 60 In a recent article, Professor Vincent Johnson
155. See Peter Coffee, Computer Literacy Isn't Kid Stuff, EWEEK.COM, May 2, 2006,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/IT-Management/Computer-Literacy-Isnt-Kid-Stuff/
(taking
exception to the California legislature's use of the word "encryption").
156. Id.
157. How strong is an encryption? The word "CAT" can be encrypted "BZS" by
substituting a letter with the previous letter in the alphabet. That is how IBM became
HAL in the movie 2001 Space Odyssey. In a technical sense, this is encrypted data,
although the encryption is extremely weak. Thus, attorneys cannot simply rely on a
software vendor's vague assurance to encrypt the data. On the other hand, the level of
confidence warranted in a vendor using a known and widely accepted standard-such as
AES-would be much higher.
158. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing exceptions

to Indiana's notification requirements). One particularly disturbing aspect of the Indiana
statute is that it renders notice to affected parties unnecessary if there is unauthorized
access to a portable electronic device "if access to the device is protected by a password
that has not been disclosed." Id. However, assuming that the attacker has access to the
device or file, it is sometimes possible to break passwords. In the case of laptops, the hard
drive can be removed from a password-protected machine and accessed by another
machine, unless the contents of the hard drive are encrypted. See Donna L. Beatty,
Malaysia's "Computer Crimes Act 1997" Gets Tough on Cybercrime but Fails to Advance
the Development of Cyberlaws, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 351, 373 (1998) ("Virus how-to

guides and code generators are available on underground world-wide Web sites and
bulletin boards. System passwords can easily be broken using software programs such as
'CRACK'-a program freely available on the Internet.").
159. See Mark Bassingthwaighte, Ten Technology Traps and How to Avoid Them, W.
VA. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34 (discussing ten technology traps and how attorneys can
avoid them); see also Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of
Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2004) (suggesting the use of
a single password system).
160. See John D. Comerford, Competent Computing: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to
Safeguard the Confidentiality and Integrity of Client Information Stored on Computers and
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analyzed the growing concerns relating to cyber security, and
although his article did not focus on attorney-client obligations,
are immune to liability
there is no reason to assume that1 attorneys
61
under the principles he discusses.
Attorneys should expect that some breaches will occur and
make plans to minimize the impact on their clients, even where
statutes do not now require it. Attorneys working with consultants
should develop plans to copy data and store it securely off-site in
order to assist in remediation efforts following a physical breach or
destruction of data.
V.

CONCLUSION

Attorneys have an ethical obligation to act in a reasonable
fashion to protect their clients' confidences. 1 6 2 This includes the
obligation to protect data stored electronically from unintended
disclosure either through inadvertent release of the information or
63
from failure to secure the data against unauthorized access.'
reasonably to prevent, detect, and remedy
Attorneys must act
1 64
security breaches.
State statutes are becoming more specific and are imposing
Computer Networks, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 642 (2006) (discussing possible
malpractice liability for failing to take appropriate precautions).
161. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 296-310 (2005). Courts have found liability for actual
damages where plaintiffs proved how their identities were stolen. See, e.g., Daly v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.S.2d 887, 893 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that a life insurance
company had a duty to protect its client's private information from theft); Bell v. Mich.
Council 25 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees, No. 246684, 2005 WL
356306, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per curiam) (holding that a union was liable
for the identity theft of its members' information because it "knew confidential
information was leaving its premises and no procedures were in place to ensure the
security of the information").
162. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) ("A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."); TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.
PROF'L CONDUCT 1.05(b), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A
(Vernon 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR. R. art. X, § 9) ("[A] lawyer shall not knowingly [rieveal
confidential information of a client .... ").
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007).

164. See id. 1.6 cmt. 17 (setting forth a lawyer's duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent unauthorized access to privileged information); see also Andrew BerkermanRodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
1, 27-32 (2004) (discussing possible security breaches and ways to avoid them).
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greater obligations on attorneys to provide notice to the client
when loss of personal information has occurred. 165 Some of these
statutes create a civil cause of action against attorneys 16 6 and all of
them undoubtedly raise the bar on what an attorney is reasonably
required to do when a breach occurs, thus implicating a higher
ethical standard. After all, it is certainly reasonable to comply
state statutes and not reasonable to violate
with mandatory
7
1

them.

6

How do attorneys meet these obligations? Most attorneys are
not trained in the increasingly complicated area of information
assurance. 1 68 Even if they are, they do not have the time to
practice9 both law and information assurance on a full-time
basis.

16

Other areas of commerce and industry, however, may be making
more progress in information assurance because of the new
statutes and regulations requiring heightened protection of health
165. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2007) (imposing a duty to disclose
a security breach); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1702 (2007) (discussing the duty to notify
any resident of Montana of any breach of personal information); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-14-1704 (2007) (defining personal information); Perkins Coie, Security Breach
Notification Chart (last visited May 20, 2008), http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/
securitybreach.pdf (providing information regarding security breach notification laws in
various jurisdictions).
166. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.45 (West 2007) (allowing a civil suit for any
violation of the statute).
167. See SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 15 (2008) (explaining that one area where attorneys
face liability for failure to comply with statutory requirements is in the area of deceptive
trade practices); see also Perkins Coie, Security Breach Notification Chart,
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/securitybreach.pdf (last visited May 20, 2008)
(discussing violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act).
Proof of a violation of a rule or statute governing the conduct of attorneys may be
considered by a trier of fact in order to understand the duty owed by the attorney but does
not, of itself, create liability to a client. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 72-73 (2008).

168. John D. Comerford, Competent Computing: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to
Safeguard the Confidentiality and Integrity of Client Information Stored on Computers and
Computer Networks, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 630 (2006) ("[F]ew practicing
attorneys possess the expertise necessary to effectively implement computer security
measures.").
169. See id. at 632 ("[Bluilding a robust computer network defense is neither cheap
nor easy."). According to one author, nationwide statistics place the median attorney
work week at fifty hours. Maria Pabon Lopez, The Future of Women in the Legal
Profession:Recognizing the ChallengesAhead by Reviewing Current Trends, 19 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 84 (2008). Most attorneys would likely report their work week does not
leave many hours available for information assurance and practice.
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care records, 17 0 financial matters,'1 71 and other areas.17 2 The
legal profession can learn from these industries and from
professionals who are developing and implementing the necessary
73
plans to prevent, detect, and remediate security breaches.'
Indeed, it appears incumbent upon attorneys to utilize this
expertise. Attorneys rely on experts from any number of fields in
representing their clients and managing their practices.' 7 4 Given
the risks to clients and attorneys from security breaches exposing
confidential information, it appears reasonable for attorneys to
employ information assistance experts to design and implement
security plans and to conduct periodic audits to provide the
In
necessary client protection and statutory compliance.' 7 5
addition to the immediate benefits to clients, attorneys who utilize
these experts might more easily convince a factfinder, should a
breach and loss occur, that the attorneys acted reasonably and 1 did
76
not act in an unethical, unlawful, or liability-producing fashion.
170. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub.
L. No. 104-191, § 264(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996) (alluding to the "record keeping
requirement" imposed by the statute).
171. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 (2007) (requiring all financial institutions subject to FTC
jurisdiction to protect customer information); Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity
Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 269-70 (2005) (describing
statutory obligations of financial institutions).
172. Pui-Wing Tam & Robin Sidel, Security Software's Mini-Boom, WALL ST. J, Oct.
2, 2007, at B3 (concerning the heightened standards for credit card processing and the
vendor-imposed fines in place for not adhering to these industry standards).
173. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2007) (listing the elements necessary "to develop,
implement, and maintain [an] information security program"); see also Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, EthicalRisks from the Use of Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1, 33-34 (2004) (explaining that attorneys may need to hire computer personnel
to protect client information).
174. Lawyers can locate experts in bar journal publications. In some fields, expert
testimony is required. Plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases ordinarily must present expert
testimony establishing the standard of care. Television Capital Corp. of Mobile v. Paxson
Comm'ns Corp., 894 A.2d 461, 469 (D.C. 2006) (noting that the rule requiring plaintiffs to
present expert testimony to establish the standard of care in legal malpractice cases is
widely followed). But see Hickox ex rel. Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So. 2d 626, 635 (Miss.
1987) (stating that the general rule requiring expert testimony to support a malpractice
claim does not apply when the attorney's conduct is "negligent as a matter of law and the
plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on liability").
175. See John D. Comerford, Competent Computing: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty to
Safeguard the Confidentiality and Integrity of Client Information Stored on Computers and
Computer Networks, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 629, 630 (2006) (acknowledging that few
attorneys possess the necessary expertise to implement the proper computer security
measures on their own).
176. A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 127 (2007)

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:781

Finally, when a security breach occurs, attorneys will want to
send more than a cold, technical notice of the breach to their
Even if such a notice satisfies the statutory
clients.
requirements,1 77 it certainly would not help to maintain the
goodwill of their clients, unless the attorney offers some assistance
in minimizing losses the clients may suffer as a result of the breach.
Moreover, there might be instances where attorneys learn of a
security breach that does not fall within the notice requirements of
the statutes, but nonetheless could prove damaging or
embarrassing to their clients. Here the attorneys should be willing
to notify their clients 178 and take reasonable measures to protect
their clients' interests.
Maintaining client confidences is important to both attorneys
and clients. Preserving clients' confidence in their attorneys 1and
79
our legal system is critical to the success of the legal profession.

("Expert testimony by those knowledgeable about the legal subject matter in question is
relevant in applying the standard."). "A defending lawyer [defending himself or herself on
a civil liability claim] may also introduce expert evidence on what constitutes care in the
circumstances of the case or to support a defense... Id. at 130.
177. See TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.103(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (putting
forth the statutory requirement of notice upon breach).
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 (1995)
("[S]hould a significant breach of confidentiality occur within a computer maintenance
company ... a lawyer may be obligated to disclose such breach to the client or clients
whose information has been revealed.").
179. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2004); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007) (imposing on attorneys a duty to keep client information
confidential).

